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Abstract
In this paper we study the real and financial effects of insider trading
in the spirit of Jain and Mirman (1999). Unlike the previous works
that address this issue, we suppose that the production of the real
good is costly and depends mainly of the price of an intermediate
good produced locally by a privately-owned firm. We show that the
real output of the final good chosen by the insider as well as the price
of the intermediate good set by the privately-owned firm are both
greater than it would be in the absence of insider trading. Further-
more, the parameters of both real markets affect the stock price and
the stock pricing rule. Besides, when compared to Jain and Mirman
(2000) and (2002), this two-tier real market structure does not alter
the amount of information disseminated in the stock price or the level
of insider trading. Next, we add a second insider to the model. We
show that competition in the financial sector decreases the level of
output produced by firm 1 and the price of the intermediate good
with respect to initial model. Moreover, it affects the insiders’ trades
and increases the amount of information revealed in the stock price. 1
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1 Introduction
It is not a coincidence that corporate executives seem to always buy and sell
their company’s securities at the right times. After all, they have access to
every bit of company information, due to their participation to real activities
underlying the financial assets that are the subject of insider trading. Be-
cause real and financial decisions are inevitably intertwined, the theoretical
research on insider trading has started to extend the pure financial models
in the spirit of Kyle (1985) to include the real aspects of the firm (Jain and
Mirman, 2000 and 2002; Daher and Mirman, 2006 and 2007). The insider
is modeled as the manager of the firm who chooses how much stock to buy
and how much output to produce in the real market, thus affecting the prof-
itability of the firm. Sometimes, the publicly-owned firm is a quantity-setting
monopolist in the real market (Jain and Mirman, 2000; Daher and Mirman,
2007), and sometimes it is competing with another privately-owned firm in a
Cournot way to determine the quantity produced of the homogeneous good
(Jain and Mirman, 2002; Daher and Mirman, 2006). In both cases and to
simplify the analysis, the real good was produced at a no cost.
However, the production process involves the use of primary production fac-
tors such as labor, capital, and land, as well as intermediate goods. It is a
characteristic feature of industrial economies that commodities are produced
by means of commodities. Data from the OECD input-output tables (OECD,
2004) show that the share of intermediate goods in production ranges from
19% to 82% across different sectors. Any change in the cost of these interme-
diate goods will ripple throughout a market economy, affecting the market
of the final good. In other words, buying and selling relationships link firms
vertically, and through these links firms engage in market interactions while
performing different functions in the value chain.
In this paper, we address this issue by assuming that the production of the
final good by the publicly-owned firm (firm 1) involves constant labor costs
as well as costs of intermediate goods. Those are locally produced by a
privately-owned firm (firm 2). Specifically, we analyze insider trading in a
static model in the spirit of Kyle (1985), where the insider of firm 1 is also
the manager of that firm and thus makes both real and financial decisions.
2
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However, in our model, the choice of the real variables will affect the market
of the intermediate good, and vice versa. A sketchy analysis suggests that an
increase in the price of the intermediate good is able to decrease the profit of
firm 1, ceteris paribus. A lower profit induces the market maker to set a lower
stock price. Inversely, any negative demand shock in the market of the final
good is able to affect the demand for the intermediate good and thus its price.
In our model, firm 1, managed by the insider, is assumed to be a monopolist.
We follow Kyle (1985) in modeling the financial market environment and
thus study a linear-normal equilibrium. Further, we assume that the stock
orders are submitted by an insider as well as noise traders. A market maker
sets stock prices competitively. The insider knows the true value of a ran-
dom shock to the value of the firm whereas the market maker knows only the
distribution of this shock. However, following Jain and Mirman (1999), the
market maker observes the total stock order as well as the noisy market price
of the real good before setting the price of the stock. The insider chooses
the real output of the final good and the stock to be traded simultaneously.
Firm 1 buys the necessary quantity of the intermediate good from firm 2,
which also holds a monopoly power on the market of the intermediate good.
We show that insider trading affects the markets of both the final and the
intermediate goods, and that the financial market variables change due to
the insider’s real decisions. For instance, the real output chosen by the in-
sider or manager of firm 1 as well as the price of the intermediate good set
by firm 2 are both greater than it would be in the absence of insider trading.
Furthermore, the parameters of both real markets affect the stock price and
the stock pricing rule. Finally, we show that, when compared to Jain and
Mirman (2000) and (2002), the two-tier real market structure does not alter
the amount of information disseminated in the stock price or the level of
insider trading.
Next, following Daher and Mirman (2006) and (2007), we add a second in-
sider, the owner of firm 1, and assume that he has no managerial respon-
sibilities. Then, we carry out a comparative static analysis between model
II (duopoly in the financial market) and model I (monopoly in the financial
market). We show that competition in the financial sector affects the stock
price coefficients as well as real variables. In particular, the level of output
produced by firm 1 and the price of the intermediate good both decrease
with respect to model I. Hence, the addition of another informed trader in-
fluences the production decision of firm 1, as well as the decision of firm 2.
Moreover, competition in the stock sector affects the insiders’ trades. Finally,
3
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the results show that Cournot competition in the stock market increases the
amount of information revealed in the stock price.
2 Model I: The Monopoly Case
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, all the random variables are defined with
respect to this probability space. Consider an economy characterized by a
financial sector and a two-tier real market structure in which the production
of a final good requires an intermediate good (or service). More specifically,
the real market is characterized by two firms, firm 1 holding a monopoly in
producing the final good and firm 2 also holds a monopoly in the production
of the intermediate good2.
The structure of the real market draws on existing models that explore the
effect of foreign direct investment on backward linkages3. More specifically,
our model is a variant of the Cournot model developed in Lin and Saggi
(2007), which in turn is based on Salinger (1988). For producing one unit of
the final good, firm 1 requires l units of labor and c units of the intermediate
good. The marginal cost of producing one unit of the final good is then
equal to the sum of the labor cost and the cost of intermediate goods. For
simplicity, the wage rate is normalized to 1. The price of the intermediate
good w is set by firm 2. The inverse demand function for the final good is
assumed to be linear and stochastic, i.e,
q
′
= (a− y)z˜
and the unitary profit of firm 1 is also stochastic and given by,
$
′
= (a− y − l − cw)z˜
where a is positive constant and z˜ is a random variable, normally distributed
with mean z¯ (assumed positive) and variance σ2z .
Firm 2 produces the intermediate good at constant marginal cost τ . Firm 1
and firm 2 interact in a two-stages process. First, firm 2 chooses the quan-
tity of the intermediate good to supply, and accordingly, its unitary price
w. Then, the manager of firm 1 decides the amount of the final good y to
2Note that the monopoly structure adopted in the real market can be easily extended
to Cournot oligopoly in the market of both the final and the intermediate goods.
3See for example Batra et al. (2003) and Lin and Saggi (2007).
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produce given the price of the intermediate good w.
On the other hand, we consider a financial market where firm 2 is privately
owned and firm 1 is publicly owned. The stock of firm 1 is publicly traded
in a competitive financial market. The value of the stock is the net profits
of the firm per share. We assume, like in Kyle (1985), that there are three
kinds of agents in the market. First, there is a risk-neutral rational trader,
the manager of firm 1, who knows the realization z of z˜, the value of the
stock. Second, there are non-rational noise traders, representing small in-
vestors with no information on z. The aggregate noise trade is assumed to
be a random variable u˜, which is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2u. Finally, there are K(K ≥ 2) risk-neutral market makers who
act like Bertrand competitors.
We follow Jain and Mirman (2000) by allowing the market makers to observe
two signals. The first one, from the real market, is denoted by q˜ = (a− y −
l− cw)(z˜ + ε˜) where ε˜ is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ε .
The second one is the total order flow, i.e., r˜ = x˜+u˜ where x˜ is the manager’s
trading order. We assume that z˜, u˜ and ε˜ are pairwise independent.
Following Kyle (1985), the financial trading mechanism is organized in two
steps. In step one, a linear pricing rule and optimal order rule are deter-
mined by the market makers and the insider, respectively, as a Bayesian
equilibrium. The market makers determine a (linear) pricing rule p, based
on their a priori beliefs, where p is a measurable function p : R × R −→ R.
The insider chooses a stock trade function x˜ = x(z˜), where x : R −→ R
is a measurable function. In the second step, the insiders observe the re-
alization z of z˜,4 and submit their stock order to the market makers based
on the equilibrium stock trade functions. The market makers also receive
orders from the noise traders, all these orders arrive as a total order flow sig-
nal r˜ = x(z˜) + u˜. The two signals are used by the market makers to set the
price p˜ = p(q˜, r˜), based on the equilibrium price function, to clear the market.
The insider only knows the realization z of z˜ and does not know the values
of u˜, ε˜, r˜, z˜ + ε˜ before his order flow decisions are made. Moreover, neither
the market maker nor firm 2 know the realization z of z˜ but both know its
distribution. Finally, the market makers cannot observe either x, u or ε.
4Random variables are denoted with a tilde. Realized values lack the tilde. The mean
of the random variable is denoted with bar.
5
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The value per share of the firm 1 is the net profit of the firm per share, i.e.,
v′ = (a− y − l − cw)yz˜ a, b > 0 (1)
and the profit of the manager is given by,
ψ1 = (v
′ − A− p˜)x˜1 + Ax˜1 (2)
where A is the compensation scheme received by the manager for his man-
agerial tasks5. When the manager receives his compensation, the value of
the firm becomes:
v = v
′ − A.
Firm 2 chooses the quantity of the intermediate good yI that maximizes its
profits, given the quantity of the final good y produced by firm 1, and sets
accordingly the price w of the intermediate product. We assume that the
intermediate product is produced at a constant marginal cost τ . Hence, firm
2’s profits are given by,
ψ2 = (w − τ)yI
such that w = f(yI) is the inverse demand function for the intermediate good
and cy = yI .
2.1 The Equilibrium Concept
This is a game of incomplete information because the market makers, unlike
the insider, do not know the realization of z˜. Hence, we seek a Bayesian-
Stackelberg equilibrium. A Bayesian-Stackelberg equilibrium is a vector of
four functions [x(.), y(.), yI(.), p(., .)] such that:
(a) Profit maximization of the manager of firm 1,
E((a− y − l − cw)yz˜ − p((a− y − l − cw)(z˜ + ε˜), x˜+ u˜))x˜ ≥
E((a− y′ − l − cw)y′z˜ − p((a− y′ − l − cw)(z˜ + ε˜), x˜′ + u˜))x˜′ (3)
for any level of trading order x˜′ and level of output y′ decided by the
manager of firm 1 .
5Following Jain and Mirman (2000), the existence of such compensation scheme is to
ensure the second order condition of the manager’s maximization problem. For more
details, see Jain and Mirman (2000) and the extended works thereafter.
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(b) Profit maximization of firm 2,
(w(yI(y))− τ)yI(y) ≥ (w(y′I(y)))− τ)y′I(y) (4)
for any level of quantity y′I of the intermediate good decided by firm
2 such that cy = yI and w is the inverse demand function for the
intermediate good.
(c) Semi-Strong Market Efficiency: The pricing rule p(., .) satisfies,
p(q˜, r˜) = E[v˜|q˜, r˜]. (5)
An equilibrium is linear if there exists constants µ0, µ1, µ2 such that,
∀q, r, p(q, r) = µ0 + µ1q + µ2r. (6)
Note that condition (3) defines the optimal strategy of the insider while (4)
reflects the Stackelberg structure of the real market. Since firm 2 is the
leader (firm 1 is the follower) so it takes the firm’s 1 output decision into its
maximization problem. Condition (5) guarantees the zero expected profits
for the market makers. The stock price, set by the market makers, is equal
to the conditional expectation of the asset given the available information.
We restrict our study to linear equilibrium. The normal distributions of the
exogenous random variables, together with the particular expression of the
demand, enable us to derive and to prove the existence of a unique linear
equilibrium.
2.2 Optimality Results
We have a game of incomplete information because the market makers, un-
like the insider, do not know the realization of z˜. We solve backward the
maximization problem of the insider in stage 2, given the assumption of lin-
ear equilibrium. The manager chooses (y, x) to maximize his expected profit,
given z. So,
Max
(y,x)
G
where G = E[v − p]x+ A.x = E[v′ − p]x. This is equivalent to,
Max
(y,x)
[(a− y − l − cw)yz − µ0 − µ1(a− y − l − cw)z − µ2x]x.
The first order necessary conditions are,
x(z) =
(a− y − l − cw)(y − µ1)z − µ0
2µ2
, (7)
7
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and
y =
(a− l − cw + µ1)
2
. (8)
From equation 8, the inverse demand for the intermediate goods equals:
w =
(a− l − 2y + µ1)
c
. (9)
In stage 1, firm 2 maximizes its profits, given the quantity of the final good
produced by firm 1. Plugging the expression of w in equation 9, the maxi-
mization problem of firm 2 becomes,
Max
yI
((
a− l − 2yI/c+ µ1
c
− τ)yI)
The first order condition implies
yI =
(a− l + µ1)c− c2τ
4
(10)
w =
(a− l + µ1 + cτ)
2c
(11)
Now, we determine the price function coefficients. First, we have,
Lemma 1 The coefficients of the price function are,
(i)
µ1 =
(a− l − cτ)σ2z
3σ2z + 8σ
2
ε
= Fk,
(ii)
µ2 =
F 2σε(1− 3k)
√
(1− 3k)k
8
√
2σu
,
where k = σ
2
z
3σ2z+8σ
2
ε
and F = (a− l − cτ) with F > 0
8
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Proof: See the Appendix.
Second, as in Jain-Mirman (2000), the compensation scheme of the insider is
needed to ensure the second order condition. Indeed, combining the second
order condition
2x(z˜)z˜ > 0 and µ2 > 0, (12)
with expression of the µ0 given by
µ0 = v¯ − µ1q¯ − µ2r¯ = (a− y − l − cw)(y − µ1)z¯ − A
In proposition 1, we provide a sufficient and necessary condition to ensure
the existence of linear equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A linear equilibrium exists if and only if,
µ0 = 0⇔ A = (a− y − l − cw)(y − µ1)
2
z¯.
Proof: See Jain and Mirman (2000).
We turn now to the characterization of the equilibrium. Proposition 2 whose
proof is relegated in appendix B, characterizes the amount of information
revealed in the equilibrium stock price as well as the insider’s conditional
profits.
Proposition 2 The information revelation and the insider’s conditional prof-
its are:
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 2σ
2
ε
σ2z (13)
pi(z˜) =
2(a− l − cτ)2σuσ4ε z˜2
(3σ2z + 8σ
2
ε)
2σz
(14)
2.3 Discussion of the equilibrium
There are several properties of this equilibrium that are worth emphasizing.
First, note that the total output produced by firm 1 and the price of the
intermediate good charged by firm 2 are both more than what is expected in
a two-tier real market structure without insider trading. Indeed, equations
(8) and (11) given by
y =
(a− l − cw + µ1)
2
w =
(a− l + µ1 + cτ)
2c
(15)
9
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show that both the total output y and the intermediate good price w are in-
creasing functions of µ1, the market maker response to the real signal. Thus
insider trading increases the production of the final good, thereby lowering
the price. This happens since an increased output has the effect of lowering
the real output price. A lower real output price conveys, ceteris paribus, a
lower realization (on average) of z to the market maker and thus induces him
to set a lower stock price.
Moreover, insider trading increases the price of the intermediate good as well.
Indeed, a greater production of the final output increases the demand of the
intermediate good addressed to firm 2, which in turn, profits to charge a
higher price. Inversely, any increase in the price of the intermediary good
is supposed to decrease the quantity demanded of that good by firm 1, and
thus decrease the production of the final good. The market price of the final
good will then rise to balance the market. If the real output price increases
more than the price of the intermediary good, the market maker observes a
higher realization (on average) of z and thus sets a higher stock price.
Recall that our model adds a two-tier real market structure to the financial
market of Jain and Mirman (1999) with one insider and two signals observed
by the market maker. The effect of real market on Jain and Mirman (1999)
has also been explored in Jain and Mirman (2000) and (2002). Indeed, Jain
and Mirman (2000) investigated the effect of the monopoly structure in the
real market on the model of Jain and Mirman (1999). Jain and Mirman
(2002) added Cournot competition in the real market to Jain and Mirman
(2000). Both papers also showed that insider trading increases the produc-
tion of the real good. One of the characteristics of the two-tier real market
structure presented in this paper is that firm 1, that acts as a follower to
firm 2 in the two-tier real market structure, is influenced by the decision of
firm 2 which charges the price of the intermediate good. Thus, the insider is
thus less able to influence the market price of the final good (and the signal
available to the market maker) by increasing his firm’s output. Indeed, the
signal observed by the market maker now depends on both the price of final
good and the price of the intermediate good.
Second, note that the two-tier real market structure does not alter the
amount of information disseminated in the stock price. The conditional vari-
ance in this model is the same found in Jain and Mirman (2000) and (2002)
(see equation 13), implying that the real market structure has no effect on
information revelation. This is due to the fact that to the deterministic na-
ture of the real market variables.
10
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Third, the level of insider trading remains the same as in the previous works.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the effect of any change in output on
the two signals is predictable for the market maker (since the outputs are
deterministic) and thus is correctly incorporated in the stock price function
(through lower weights on the two signals). Thus the insider’s optimal re-
sponse remains unchanged.
In the next section, we extend our model to two insiders. In other words,
we introduce Cournot competition among the insiders in the financial sector.
Formally,
3 Model II: The Duopoly Case
In this model, we extend model I to incorporate Cournot competition be-
tween two insiders in the financial market: the manager of the firm and
the owner who has no managerial responsibilities6. We assume that the two
insiders know the realization z of z˜ and trade based on their private informa-
tion. Introducing Cournot competition in the financial market allows us to
study the effect of the strategic competition in the financial market on the
equilibrium outcomes.
Under Cournot competition in the financial market, a Bayesian-Stackelberg
equilibrium is a vector of five functions [x1(.), x2(.), y(.), yI(.), p(., .)] such
that:
(a) Profit maximization of the manager of firm 1,
E((a− y − l − cw)yz˜ − p((a− y − l − cw)(z˜ + ε˜), x˜1 + x˜2 + u˜))x˜1 ≥
E((a− y′ − l − cw)y′z˜ − p((a− y′ − l − cw)(z˜ + ε˜), x˜′1 + x˜2 + u˜))x˜′1(16)
for any level of trading order x˜′1 and level of output y
′ decided by the
manager of firm 1 .
(b) Profit maximization of the owner,
E((a− y − l − cw)yz˜ −B − p((a− y − l − cw)(z˜ + ε˜), x˜1 + x˜2 + u˜))x˜2 ≥
E((a− y − l − cw)yz˜ − p((a− y′ − l − cw)(z˜ + ε˜), x˜1 + x˜′2 + u˜))x˜′2(17)
for any level of trading order x˜′2 decided by the owner of firm 1 .
6It should be pointed out that the results can be automatically generalized to n insiders,
but for the sake of comparison we restrict our attention to the two-insiders case.
11
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(c) Profit maximization of firm 2,
(w(yI(y))− τ)yI(y) ≥ (w(y′I(y)))− τ)y′I(y) (18)
for any level of quantity y′I of the intermediate good decided by firm
2 such that cy = yI and w is the inverse demand function for the
intermediate good.
(d) Semi-Strong Market Efficiency: The pricing rule p(., .) satisfies,
p(q˜, r˜) = E[v˜|q˜, r˜]. (19)
Proposition 3, we characterize the unique linear equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Under Cournot competition in the financial market, a linear
equilibrium exists and is unique. It is characterized by
x˜1 =
(a− y − l − cw)(y − µ1)z˜
3µ2
x˜2 =
(a− y − l − cw)(y − µ1)(z˜ − z¯)
3µ2
(20)
y =
(a− l − cw + µ1)
2
w =
(a− l + µ1 + cτ)
2c
(21)
µ0 = B =
(a− y − l − cw)(y − µ1)z¯
3
, µ1 =
(a− l − cτ)σ2z
3σ2z + 12σ
2
ε
= Fk1, (22)
µ2 =
F 2σε(1− 3k1)
√
(1− 3k1)k1
4
√
6σu
, V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
σ2z (23)
and
pi1 =
9(a− l − cτ)2σuσ4ε z˜2
2
√
2(3σ2z + 12σ
2
ε)
2σz
pi2 =
9(a− l − cτ)2σuσ4ε(z˜ − z¯)2
2
√
2(3σ2z + 12σ
2
ε)
2σz
(24)
where k1 =
σ2z
3σ2z+12σ
2
ε
and F = (a− l − cτ)
12
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4 Comparative statics
In this section, we present several comparisons between the results of models
I and II. Note that these comparisons highlight the effects of competition
in the financial sector on both the real and financial sectors as well as the
decisions of the insiders. The effect of competition in the financial sector
on financial and real variables has been studied in several works before: For
instance, Daher and Mirman (2007) investigated the effect of Cournot com-
petition in the financial sector with a monopoly structure in the real market,
on the model of Jain and Mirman (2000), characterized by a monopoly struc-
ture in both the real and financial markets. Moreover, Daher and Mirman
(2006) introduced Cournot competition in the financial sector to the model
of Jain and Mirman (2002) characterized by a monopoly structure in the
financial market and Cournot competition in the real market.
Introducing Cournot competition to model I has two effects. On the one
hand, it enables us to study the effect of Cournot competition between the
insiders as compared to the monopoly case studied in the first model of this
paper. On the other hand, it allows us to capture the effect of the two-tier
real market structure on the equilibrium variables, as compared with the
monopoly and duopoly real market structure existing in previous works.
4.1 Equilibrium outcomes
Lemma 2 provides a comparative static analysis of equilibrium outcomes be-
tween the Cournot competition model (model II) and the previous model
(model I). It shows that the stock price coefficients are affected by Cournot
competition in the financial sector. Moreover, the production of firm 1 and
the price charged by firm 2 decrease with respect to model I. Finally, we can
notice that the manager trades less and earns less than in model 1. Formally
Lemma 2 The effects of Cournot competition on equilibrium outcomes rel-
ative to the monopoly case are given by7,
µ0 > µ
M1
0 µ1 < µ
M1
1 µ2 < µ
M1
2 (25)
w < wM1 y < yM1 x˜1 < x˜
M1 (26)
7The superscript M1 refers to model I.
13
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First, competition in the financial sector affects the stock price set by the
market makers. Lemma 2, shows that the intercept coefficient of the stock
price, µ0, is greater than in model I. Indeed, to satisfy the second order condi-
tion of the maximization problem of the manager of firm 1, and to guarantee
the existence of a linear equilibrium, competition in the financial sector re-
quires that the compensation scheme of the manager (which is positive) has
the value µ0. In the absence of competition in the financial sector (model
I), µ0 must be equal to zero. However, in the presence of competition in
the financial sector, the market makers set µ0 different from zero in order to
satisfy the zero expected profits.
The value of µ1, the response of the market makers to the real signal, is also
less than in model I. The same results hold in Daher and Mirman (2007)
who model Cournot competition in the financial market with a monopoly
structure in the real market, when compared with Jain and Mirman (2000)
where a monopoly structure characterizes both markets. They also hold in
Daher and Mirman (2006) where Cournot duopoly exists in the financial and
real markets, in comparison with Jain and Mirman (2002) where Cournot
competition characterizes only the real market. In other words, the two-tier
real market structure does not alter the previous findings concerning µ0 and
µ1. In order to understand this result recall the expression of µ1 in model I
and in our model, i.e.
µM11 =
(a− l − cτ)σ2z
3σ2z + 8σ
2
ε
and µ1 =
(a− l − cτ)σ2z
3σ2z + 12σ
2
ε
which depends on the value of the firm, the noisy signal and the total or-
der flow (through the coefficient of σ2ε). Hence, as the number of insiders
increases, the total order flow increases. Thus the coefficient of the noise in
the denominator increases which lowers the value of µ1. This result reflects
the fact that with two insiders there is more information in the order flow
signal which gets more weights, and thus makes the value of µ1 lower than
in model I.
However, and contrary to what is found in the previous works, the response
of the market makers to the total order flow signal, µ2, is always lower than
in model I. This is an interesting result which shows that, in the presence
of the two-tier real market structure, the value of µ2 the relationship which
exists between exogenous variances of the model, mainly σ2ε and σ
2
z does not
affect the value of µ2 like in Daher-Mirman (2006) and Daher-Mirman (2007).
14
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Second, competition in the financial sector affects the real market variables.
In fact, the level of output produced by firm 1 and the price of the inter-
mediate good both decrease with respect to model I. To see this, recall the
expressions of y and w in both models,
y =
(a− l − cw + µ1)
2
w =
(a− l + µ1 + cτ)
2c
(27)
Hence, y and w are both a function of µ1, the coefficient of the real sector
signal of the stock price, which is set by the market makers. Plugging the
equation of w in the equation of y gives a positive relation between y and
µ1. Lemma 2 shows that competition in the stock sector reduces the value
of µ1 and thus, the output of firm 1 as well as the price of the intermediate
good with respect to model I. Hence, the addition of another informed trader
influences the production decision of firm 1, as well as the decision of firm 2.
Moreover, it worth mentioning that regardless of the type of competition
between the insiders, the introduction of the financial sector increases the
quantity produced of the final good as well as the price of the intermedi-
ate good. Indeed, equation (27) reveals the positive correlation between the
quantity produced y and µ1 as well as between the price of the intermediate
good w and µ1. Thus, the financial market has a positive effect on the two-
tier real market variables.
Third, competition in the stock sector affects the insiders’ trades. This result
is consistent with the financial Kyle (1985) model with one signal (the total
order flow), going from one to two insiders (Tighe, 1989). Indeed, Lemma
2(iv) shows that the manager’s trading level is less than in model I. The same
result holds in Daher and Mirman (2007) where Cournot competition in the
financial market is introduced to the real market monopoly structure of Jain
and Mirman (2000). This result is also true in Daher and Mirman (2006)
who extend the real market duopoly structure of Jain and Mirman (2002) to
incorporate Cournot competition between the insiders.
4.2 Informativeness of stock price
In this section we examine the extent to which the stock price reveals infor-
mation. This issue was originally studied by Kyle (1985) as well as Rochet
and Vila (1994). They found that the stock price reveals exactly half of the
inside information, regardless of the parameter values of the model. More-
over, in Kyle (1985) with more than one informed trader, the amount of
15
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information revealed increases in the number of traders, but is still constant
and independent of the parameter values of the model. This independence
result is due to the fact that the insider has only one option, i.e. either
to buy or sell stock, and has no effect on the value of the firm. When the
manager is able to affect the value of the firm, and with the availability of a
second signal to the market maker, the results change. This was particularly
the case of Jain and Mirman (2000) who show that, when the manager is a
quantity-setting monopolist in the real market, the amount of information
released by the insider is greater than half, and, depends on the parameters of
the model. Daher and Mirman (2007) show that, when Cournot competition
between the insiders exists, the stock price reveals even more information
than Jain and Mirman (2000), since competition in the stock market makes
the order flow more informative. The same is true in Daher and Mirman
(2006) who extend the Cournot real market structure of Jain and Mirman
(2002) to incorporate Cournot competition in the financial market.
Following Jain and Mirman (2000) as well as the subsequent works, we adopt
the same measure of information i.e., the conditional variance of z˜, given the
information of the market maker.
Lemma 3 The effect of Cournot competition on information revelation rel-
ative to the monopoly case is given by,
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) < V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜)M1 (28)
Lemma 3 shows that there is more information revealed in model II than in
model I. Cournot competition in the stock market increases the amount of
information revealed in the stock price. This result is consistent with the
findings of Daher and Mirman (2006) and (2007). Indeed, the expressions of
the conditional variances measuring the amount of information revealed in
the stock price in model I and in our model are:
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜)M1 = σ
2
ε
σ2z + 2σ
2
ε
σ2z and V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) =
σ2ε
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
σ2z
The key difference between these two conditional variances is the coefficient
of σ2ε in the denominator. The greater the value of this coefficient, the greater
the amount of information revealed in the stock price is. The origin of this
value is the aggregate orders of the insiders. The aggregate order in the
Cournot case is greater than in model I. 8.
8x˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 =
√
2σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯), x˜M1 = σuσz (z˜ − z¯)
16
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4.3 Insider’s profits
In this section, we compare the manager’s profits with model I.
Lemma 4 The effect of Cournot competition on the manager’s profits rela-
tive to the monopoly case is given by,
pi1 < pi
M1 if σ2z <
24(
√√
2− 1)
9− 6
√√
2
σ2ε and pi1 > pi
M1 otherwise (29)
Adding a second informed trader to model I does not always lower the man-
ager’s profits relative to the monopoly case. Indeed, Lemma 4 shows that
the profits of the manager in this model are greater than in model 1 when
σ2ε is small relative to σ
2
z , and they are less than model I when σ
2
ε is large
relative to σ2z . The intuition for this result is that when σ
2
ε is large relative
to σ2z , the unconditional net profits of the firm is less in this model than in
model I. In contrast, when σ2ε is small relative to σ
2
z , the opposite is true, i.e.
the net profits of the firm in model I is lower.
Finally, it is worth noting that the profits of firm 2 decrease with respect to
model I:
ψ2 < ψ
M1
2 (30)
This result is straightforward from Lemma 2. Indeed, we showed that com-
petition in the financial sector decreases the level of output produced by firm
1 and the price of the intermediate good charged by firm 2. The lower price
for the intermediate good explains why the profits of Firm 2 decrease with
respect to model I.
Appendix A
We start this appendix by recalling the Theorem that we use to prove Lemma
1. Then we prove this Lemma.
Theorem 1 If the p× 1 vector Y is normally distributed with mean U and
covariance V and if the vector Y is partitioned into two subvectors such that
Y =
(
Y1
Y2
)
and if Y ∗ =
(
Y1
Y ∗2
)
U =
(
U1
U2
)
and V =
(
V11 V12
V21 V22
)
17
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are the corresponding partitions of Y ∗,U and V, then the conditional dis-
tribution of the m × 1 (m < p) vector Y1 given the vector Y2 = Y ∗2 is the
multivariate normal distribution with mean U1 + V12V
−1
22 (Y
∗
2 - U2) and co-
variance matrix V11 − V12V −122 V21.
Proof : See Graybill, Theorem 3.10 pp 63.
Proof of Lemma 1:
We apply Theorem 1 to the normal random vector B = (v˜, q˜, r˜). First, in
this case we have p = 3 and m = 1. Second by identification, we have Y1 = v˜
and Y2 =
(
q˜
r˜
)
. U1 = v¯, U2 =
(
q¯
r¯
)
and
V =
 σ2v σvq σvrσvq σ2q σqr
σvr σqr σ
2
r
 = ( V11 V12
V21 V22
)
Where V11 = σ
2
v , V12 = (σvq, σvr), V21 =
(
σvq
σvr
)
and V22 =
(
σ2q σqr
σqr σ
2
r
)
.
Note that
V −122 =
1
D
(
σ2r −σqr
−σqr σ2q
)
,
where D is the determinant of V22, that is D = σ
2
qσ
2
r − σ2qr.
So we obtain,
µ0 = v¯ − µ1q¯ − µ2r¯ (31)
µ1 =
σvqσ
2
r − σvrσqr
D
(32)
µ2 =
σvrσ
2
q − σvqσqr
D
(33)
We start now by computing all the covariances in the last two expressions.
Indeed, we have
σvq = (a− y − l − cw)2yσ2z
σ2r =
(a− y − l − cw)2(y − µ1)2
4µ22
σ2z + σ
2
u
18
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σvr =
(a− y − l − cw)2(y − µ1)y
2µ2
σ2z
σ2q = (a− y − l − cw)2(σ2z + σ2ε)
σqr =
(a− y − l − cw)2(y − µ1)
2µ2
σ2z
Substituting for the variances and covariances in (32) and (33), we get
µ1 =
(a− y − l − cw)2yσ2zσ2u
D
, (34)
µ2 =
(a− y − l − cw)4y(y − µ1)σ2zσ2ε
µ2D
. (35)
Computing (34) and (35), we obtain
µ22 =
(a− y − l − cw)2µ1(y − µ1)σ2ε
2σ2u
(36)
Calculating for the expression of D, we get
D =
(a− y − l − cw)4(y − µ1)2σ2εσ2z
4µ22
+ (a− y − l − cw)2σ2u(σ2ε + σ2z).
Substituting the above expression of D in (35), we find
µ22 =
(a− y − l − cw)2(y − µ1)(y + µ1)σ2εσ2z
4σ2u(σ
2
ε + σ
2
z)
. (37)
Solving (36) and (37), we get
2µ1(σ
2
ε + σ
2
z) = σ
2
z(y + µ1).
Substituting for y to solve µ1, we obtain
µ1 =
(a− l − cτ)σ2z
3σ2z + 8σ
2
ε
(38)
To solve for µ2, we substitute the above value of µ1 in (36) and taking the
positive root, we get
µ2 =
F 2σε(1− 3k)
√
(1− 3k)k
8
√
2σu
, (39)
where k = σ
2
z
3σ2z+8σ
2
ε
and F = (a− l − cτ)
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Appendix B: proof of Proposition 2
Applying Theorem 1 to the normal random vector (z˜, q˜, r˜), the conditional
variance is given by
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) = σ2z −
µ1
(a− y − l − cw)yσzq −
µ2
(a− y − l − cw)yσzr
=
(y − µ1)
3y
σ2z
=
σ2ε
σ2z + 2σ
2
ε
σ2z
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